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Out on Parol?: A Critical Examination
of the Alaska Supreme Court's
Application of the Parol Evidence Rule
This note chronicles the imprecision and confusion that has
plagued the application of the parol evidence rule in Alaska. By
failing to adopt a comprehensible theory under which the rule can
be consistently applied by practitioners, the Alaska Supreme Court
has further complicated a substantive rule that is inherently
perplexing, creating uncertainty regarding when extrinsic evidence
is admissible in any particular case. This note begins with an
overview of the basics of the parol evidence rule, followed by an
analysis of the early development of a restrictive rule in Alaska.
Next, the court's transition to a more liberal application is
compared to the direct, and thus more effective, approaches
employed in California and Arizona. The note concludes with an
evaluation of recent attempts at clarification that have given the
rule greater impact and a plea to the Alaska Supreme Court to set
the parol evidence issue to rest by issuing an exhaustive opinion,
at its next opportunity, detailing the court's theoretical stance and
explaining how the rule will be consistently applied in the future.
I. INTRODUCTION
Regardless of which state's rule is being examined, any student
of the law of contract would describe the parol evidence rule as
confusing in its very nature, and Alaska's version of the rule is
certainly no exception. Moreover, through its hesitance to
explicitly lay down the state of the law at any particular time, the
Alaska Supreme Court has done more to muddy the waters further
than to illuminate Alaska's treatment of the rule. The result over
the years has been frustration on the part of practitioners and
confusion within the supreme court itself, culminating in a claim by
an advocate before the court in 1989 that the parol evidence rule
was "a dead letter in Alaska."' This note will attempt to chronicle
the rule's development in Alaska and, by drawing parallels to other
states, will detail the current state of the law in Alaska, contending
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that the Alaska Supreme Court is moving in the right direction by
giving greater effect to the rule.
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
A. Definition
The parol evidence rule is a rule of contract interpretation that
bars the introduction of extrinsic evidence that would contradict or
supplement an integrated written agreement. The rule is not
limited to parol, or oral, evidence but extends to all evidence of
prior negotiations between contracting parties. As E. Allan
Farnsworth notes in his seminal treatise on contracts, it is helpful
to think of the rule as one of "prior negotiation" rather than one
of "parol evidence."' Further, the rule is not one of evidence,
through which courts bar a particular method of proving a fact; the
parol evidence rule bars the admission of the fact itself and is thus
a rule of substantive law.3 The rationale of the rule is simple: once
an agreement has been made and reduced to writing, prior
agreements reached during negotiations are superseded by the
writing and should not be enforced. Therefore, evidence of prior
agreements is not admissible. This general rationale for the parol
evidence rule is universally accepted; confusion arises only upon its
application.
B. Application
The parol evidence rule is applicable only where the contract
at issue is integrated-that is, where the parties intended the
contract to be a final and complete expression of their agreement.4
There are two forms of integration, complete and partial. When a
contract is found to be completely integrated, evidence of prior
agreements presented to contradict the contract terms is not
allowed. When a contract is only partially integrated, however,
evidence of prior agreements that supplements, but does not
contradict, the writing is admissible.5 The theoretical dispute
surrounding the parol evidence rule revolves around this primary
question of integration.
2. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.2, at 193-94
(1990).
3. Id. at 194.




The determination of integration is based upon the intention
of the parties. If a writing appears to be thorough and complete,
then a court is likely to find integration, but most courts will allow
evidence to be presented to show that the parties did not so
intend.' Once integration is found, it must be determined whether
the contract is completely or partially integrated. Again, the
question is one of intention: did the parties intend the contract to
be the final expression of their entire agreement, complete
integration, or did they simply intend it to be a final expression of
the terms contained in the writing, partial integration?7
Under the traditional, restrictive view of contract interpreta-
tion, supported primarily by Professor Williston, if a writing
appears on its face to be a complete expression of the agreement,
then the court should not look beyond the document and should
find the contract to be completely integrated.8 Professor Corbin,
however, representing the modem, liberal approach to the parol
evidence rule, contends that all relevant circumstances should be
taken into account when determining integration, including
evidence of prior negotiations.' The trend among the states has
been to adopt the Corbin approach."
Because the determination of integration depends upon the
intention of the parties involved, it would seem to be a question for
the trier of fact. In most courts, however, the integration issue is
resolved by the trial judge as a matter of law." After the prelimi-
nary finding of partial or complete integration, the court turns to
interpreting the language that makes up the agreement. All courts
agree that where such language is vague or ambiguous, the parol
evidence rule permits evidence of surrounding circumstances to be
introduced, including evidence of prior negotiations, to resolve any
ambiguity. 2 A conflict occurs between the traditional and liberal
views, however, where the language of the agreement appears to be
clear or unambiguous on its face.
6. Id. at 200.
7. Id. at 202.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 203.
10. Id. at 203-04 (collecting cases).
11. Id. at 209.
12. Id. § 7.12, at 269.
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III. THE TRADITIONAL, WILLISTON APPROACH
A. The Basics of the Wiliston Approach
Under the traditional, or "plain meaning," approach, which
was championed by Professor Williston and incorporated in the first
Restatement of Contracts, 3 evidence of prior negotiations is
admitted only where an ambiguity can be found in the docu-
ment. 4 This view is sometimes mistakenly referred to as the
"four corners" approach, meaning that, where no ambiguity exists,
the court, in interpreting a contract term, will refer only to
evidence found within the "four corners" of the document."5 The
four corners approach is more restrictive than plain meaning, which
allows evidence of surrounding circumstances, but not of prior
negotiations. 16
Where the traditional view is employed, determination of
admissibility under the parol evidence rule ordinarily involves a
two-step process. First, the court decides whether the contract
language is ambiguous as a matter of law. If ambiguity is found to
exist, the court then allows evidence of prior negotiations to resolve
the ambiguity. 7 By framing the first step as a question of law,
courts following the traditional approach allow for judicial review
of the decision regarding ambiguity and thus foster consistency
within a jurisdiction. The traditional approach also conserves
judicial resources by tolerating only limited litigation on questions
of interpretation where the meaning of a document appears to be
clear.'" The Alaska Supreme Court's initial application of the
parol evidence rule followed the traditional approach.' 9
B. Early Confusion in Alaska
The confusion surrounding the development of case law in
Alaska concerning the application of the parol evidence rule began
as early as the 1960's. Although the court made it clear that
extrinsic evidence of prior negotiations would be allowed where
13. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 230 & cmt. a (1932).
14. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 270.
15. Id. at 271 n.8.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 271.
18. Id.
19. See infra part III.B.
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ambiguity was found, in the latter half of the decade its decisions
reflected inconsistency as to whether Alaska employed the
traditional or liberal approach when a document appeared to be
clear on its face. In 1965, for example, in Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.
of Anchorage v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.,2' the court
invoked the four comers approach and held that where an
insurance policy is clear and unambiguous on its face, the parties'
intent must be ascertained from the document itself.21 Three
years later in Port Valdez Co. v. City of Valdez, the court
extended the four comers approach to non-insurance cases.2
3
Only one year later, however, without any explanation, the court
reversed its position when it held in Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee
24
that words can never be completely unambiguous and summarily
dismissed the traditional ambiguity requirement, stating:
[I]t is invariably necessary, before a court can give any meaning
to the words of a contract and can select one meaning rather
than other possible ones as the basis for the determination of
rights and other legal effects, that extrinsic evidence shall be
heard to make the court aware of the "surrounding circumstanc-
es," including the persons, objects, and events to which the
words can be applied and which caused the words to be used.'
Five years after Alaska Placer, the court finally acknowledged
in Day v. A & G Construction Co.26 that there was a "possibility
of some confusion"'27 arising out of its positions in prior cases.'
Nevertheless, the Day court decided not to resolve this confusion
because the only question at issue in that case was whether a
particular phrase was ambiguous. 29 If Alaska did not require a
finding of ambiguity for parol evidence to be admitted, however, as
was held in Alaska Placer, then the question of whether "a portion
20. 407 P.2d 1009 (Alaska 1965).
21. Id. at 1013.
22. 437 P.2d 768 (Alaska 1968).
23. Id. at 771-72.
24. 455 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1969).
25. Id. at 221 (quoting 3A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACrS
§ 536, at 28 (1960)). The court held that meaning was not so clear as to bar
extrinsic evidence as to the intentions of the parties. Id.
26. 528 P.2d 440 (Alaska 1974).
27. Id. at 443 n.4.
28. See Robert C. Erwin, Parol Evidence or Not Parol Evidence in Alaska, 8
ALASKA L.J. 20 (1970).
29. See Day, 528 P.2d at 444 n.4.
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of the contract at issue is ambiguous"3 should have been of no
concern. Thus, the issue of whether the parol evidence rule
requires a finding of ambiguity certainly could have, and should
have, been addressed in Day. The court's failure to resolve these
inconsistencies when presented with an opportunity to do so
foreshadowed the future inconsistencies and the resulting confusion
among practitioners that would plague the court for decades.
C. The Establishment of the Traditional Rule
Finally, in 1976, the Alaska Supreme Court took a firm stand
and embraced the traditional version of the parol evidence rule,
temporarily ending the confusion. In National Bank of Alaska v.
J. B. L. & K. of Alaska, Inc., 31 the trial court refused to admit
extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' intentions under a
covenant not to compete included in a contract finalizing the sale
of an insurance business. National Bank contended that the
covenant was ambiguous and that parol evidence relating to the
parties' intent should have been admitted. Holding that a finding
of ambiguity was required in Alaska before parol evidence could
be admitted, the supreme court found the disputed evidence
unambiguous and affirmed the trial court.
The court first assumed that the trial court had found the
contract to be integrated because the court had treated it as such
and because neither party had disputed the fact.32 With integra-
tion, extrinsic evidence could not be admitted to add to or vary the
agreement, leaving the document as the sole subject of interpreta-
tion.33 In interpreting such a contract, however, the court was not
limited to a mere inspection of the document. Instead, a two-
step approach was employed. The first step was to determine
whether an ambiguity existed, considering all of the surrounding
circumstances. "'Only after a careful and painstaking search of all
the factors shedding light on the intent of the parties ' 31 could a
court make this determination. If the document was found to be
30. Id.
31. 546 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1976).
32. Id. at 583 n.7.
33. Id. at 583 (citing 3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACrS § 603 (1961)).
34. Id. at 585. Although invoking the traditional view, the court decided upon
the plain meaning approach rather than the four comers approach. See supra note
15 and accompanying text.
35. Id. (quoting 3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 600A (1961)).
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clear and unambiguous, then the court would confine itself to the
document in interpreting the parties' intent. If ambiguity was
found, however, then evidence of the surrounding circumstances
could be further consulted to resolve the question of intent.36
Thus, with National Bank, the traditional approach to the parol
evidence rule seemed to be firmly in place in Alaska.
D. The Progression Towards the Liberal Approach
Within a year of National Bank, however, the court began to
hint at a desire to stray from its newly adopted position. The
Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Wessells v. State, Department
of Highways7 affirmed National Bank, further explaining the two-
step analysis employed in parol evidence rule cases. In describing
the first stage, the court held that ambiguity would not be found to
exist simply because two parties disagreed as to how the contract
should be construed. Ambiguity existed only where the terms in
dispute were "reasonably subject to differing interpretation after
viewing the contract as a whole and the extrinsic evidence sur-
rounding the disputed terms.''38 Thus, Wessells appeared, at the
time, to be a continuation of an explicit, traditional approach to
applying the parol evidence rule, providing a well-settled approach
with which trial courts and practitioners could become comfortable.
Unfortunately the seeds of dissension, which would eventually alter
the parol evidence rule in Alaska, were sewn into Wessells itself.
Although it likely seemed of minor importance at the time,
footnote thirty-nine of the Wessells opinion can be seen as the
beginning of Alaska's move to the liberal approach to the parol
evidence rule. In that footnote, following the final word of the
opinion, Chief Justice Boochever and Justice Rabinowitz exhibited
support for Professor Corbin's liberal approach, which would allow
admission of extrinsic evidence in all cases to determine the
reasonable expectations of the parties.39 They suggested that the
two-tiered approach, which the court employed in Wessells, was
"unduly cumbersome" and offered minimal advantage over an
approach that considered extrinsic evidence initially4" and, thus,
36. Id. at 584.
37. 562 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1977).
38. Id. at 1046 (citing, inter alia, National Bank, 546 P.2d at 584-86).




recommended that the court dispense with the requirement of an
initial finding of ambiguity.4'
In Tsakres v. Owens,4' an opinion delivered just two days
after Wessells, the majority of the court again confirmed that the
traditional two-tiered approach was the standard in Alaska,
outlining that approach and reaffirming the definition of ambiguity
espoused in Wessells.4' The Tsakres opinion explicitly stated that
without a finding of ambiguity, "the prerequisite for admissibility
of parol evidence is lacking."'  In a concurrence, however, Chief
Justice Boochever and Justice Rabinowitz, citing footnote thirty-
nine of the Wessells opinion, affirmed their opposition to the
ambiguity requirement and again criticized the two-tiered ap-
proach.45
At this point, a stark theoretical disagreement existed among
the justices on the Alaska Supreme Court. Three members in
Wessells and Tsakres-Justices Connor, Erwin, and Burke-suppor-
ted Williston's traditional approach. Two members-Chief Justice
Boochever and Justice Rabinowitz-explicitly declared their
allegiance to Corbin's approach to the rule. Thus, after Tsakres,
the parol evidence rule in Alaska was again in a state of uncertain-
ty. Because the application of the rule could change drastically
with the swing of a single vote, apprehension as to its status was
likely great.
In fact, it is probable that the initial confusion surrounding the
rule had never totally abated. At the time of the splintering in
Tsakres and Wessells, an explicit parol evidence rule had only been
in place for fifteen months. The result of such instability would be
frustration among Alaska's practitioners of contract law and within
its trial courts. It would be impossible to utilize the parol evidence
41. Id.
42. 561 P.2d 1218 (Alaska 1977).
43. Id. at 1221-22 (citing Wessells, 562 P.2d at 1046).
44. Id. at 1221. The court in Tsakres also held that the interpretation of words
is a question of law to be determined by the court, although resolution of a dispute
about surrounding circumstances is a matter for the trier of fact. Because
questions of meaning are for the court, higher courts are not bound by the trial
court's views, and the "clearly erroneous" standard that applies to findings of fact
is inapplicable. Id. at 1222. With the eventual shift to the liberal approach, which
dismisses the initial finding of ambiguity as a matter of law, this "clearly
erroneous" standard becomes vital, as higher courts are more often required to
defer to the judgment of the trial court.
45. Id. at 1223 (Boochever, C.J., concurring).
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mechanism effectively when the application of the rule was subject
to change with virtually every supreme court case.
IV. THE LIBERAL, CORBIN APPROACH
A. The Basics of the Corbin Approach
As noted by Chief Justice Boochever and Justice Rabinowitz
in the Wessells footnote, under Professor Corbin's approach to the
parol evidence rule, evidence of surrounding circumstances should
always be admitted to determine the intention of the parties.' No
finding of ambiguity is required. Even under this liberal view,
however, parol evidence that contradicts the writing will not be
admitted. A court must still determine whether evidence is
proffered for purposes of interpretation or contradiction. Thus,
even under the liberal view, extrinsic evidence is admissible only
where the question is one of ambiguity or vagueness, as interpreta-
tion deals with problems that "derive from the failure of lan-
guage. '47
The principal advantage of the liberal approach is that it seeks
to minimize the inherent ambiguity of all language by introducing
evidence of relevant surrounding circumstances. Admitting such
extrinsic evidence will better allow the court to determine the
expectations of the parties' and, thereby, effectuate the purpose
of contract interpretation, enforcing the agreement to which the
parties intended to be bound. Nationally, the trend has been
toward adopting this liberal approach.49
B. Trends Toward the Corbin Approach
As with many theoretical movements in American jurispru-
dence, the first state to switch to the liberal approach to the parol
evidence rule was California, which made the jump in the late
1960's. Arizona followed the trend more recently, in the early
1980's. Both of these states instituted an approach similar to that
suggested by Chief Justice Boochever and Justice Rabinowitz, who
would eventually succeed in swaying the Alaska court toward
46. See Wessells v. State Dep't of Highways, 562 P.2d 1042, 1052 n.39 (Alaska
1977); see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 7.12, at 272.
47. Id. at 273.
48. Id. at 277-78.
49. Id. § 7.3, at 203-04 (collecting cases).
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adopting their views. Contrary to what would eventually occur in
Alaska, however, the court in California, realizing that a theoretical
change would drastically impact the manner in which contract law
would be practiced, was explicit in stating that a major theoretical
change was occurring and was precise in explaining the practical
effects of such a change.
1. California. The California Supreme Court, led by Chief
Justice Roger Traynor, discarded the traditional parol evidence rule
in a series of opinions handed down in 1968.50 The move began
slowly in Masterson v. Sine,5 where the court found that, although
the state had indicated compliance with the traditional rule, such
"strict formulations" had not been applied consistently." In
holding that parol evidence of collateral agreements should be
excluded only where the jury may be misled easily, the court
embraced the Corbin approach. The Masterson opinion drew a
vigorous dissent maintaining that the parol evidence rule was being
abrogated. The dissent argued that by admitting parol evidence to
vary a contract that appeared clear on its face, the court "lessens
the reliance which may be placed upon written instruments."53
Nevertheless, the California court continued on its path toward
liberalizing the parol evidence rule shortly thereafter in Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,4 a
frequently cited case in support of the Corbin approach. In Pacific
Gas, the California court set out the rule to be followed in all
subsequent cases and explained the theoretical reasoning behind
the change. The court stated that the intention of the parties to a
contract can never be determined by mere examination of the
words of a document.55 Even where courts purport to invoke the
four corners rule, meaning is necessarily determined according to
"extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and
experience."5 6 The court implied that perfect verbal expression is
never possible, and, therefore, deference to a judge's facial
50. See generally Olivia W. Karlin & Louis W. Karlin, The California Parol
Evidence Rule, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1361 (1992).
51. 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
52. Id. at 563.
53. Id. at 567 (Burke, J., dissenting).
54. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
55. Id. at 644-45.
56. Id. at 643 (citing 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACrS § 579,
at 225 n.56 (Supp. 1964)).
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interpretation of a contract's terms, without allowing testimony of
surrounding circumstances to contradict his conclusions, severely
limits the court's ability to determine the true intention of the
parties.5 7
Thus, in determining whether extrinsic evidence should be
admissible for purposes of interpretation, the court should not look
at whether the document appears to be clear and unambiguous on
its face, but rather at "whether the offered evidence is relevant to
prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is
reasonably susceptible."5" The court recognized that extrinsic
evidence cannot be admitted to add to, contradict or vary a written
contract but reasoned that the meaning of the terms must first be
determined before a court can decide if the evidence is being
introduced for a prohibited purpose. 9 To determine the intention
of the parties, a court must consider all credible evidence offered
for that purpose. By considering all the circumstances surrounding
contract formation, a court is able to place itself in the situation of
the parties.6" In light of these circumstances, if the contract
language is "fairly susceptible" to either of the offered explana-
tions, then extrinsic evidence to prove either of such meanings is
admissible." Later in 1968, Pacific Gas was affirmed in Delta
Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto,62 confirming that the liberal approach to
the parol evidence rule was firmly established in California.
57. Id. at 644-45.
58. Id. at 644. This "reasonably susceptible" test would become the
cornerstone of the liberal approach to the parol evidence rule. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 215 cmt. b (1979); infra note 106 and accompanying
text.
59. Pacific Gas & Electric, 442 P.2d at 645.
60. Id. (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 646 (citations omitted). The court noted that under the traditional
rule such evidence would be admissible "on the stated ground that the contract
was ambiguous." Id. at 646 n.8. The court claimed that the old rule "is harmless
if it is kept in mind that the ambiguity may be exposed by extrinsic evidence that
reveals more than one possible meaning." Id. Under the traditional approach,
ambiguity is established, not merely because two parties disagree, but because the
court finds the language "reasonably subject to differing interpretation." See supra
text accompanying note 38. Although the difference is subtle, the traditional
approach requires a higher level of susceptibility before extrinsic evidence will be
admitted.
62. 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968).
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2. Arizona. In the early 1980's, the Arizona Supreme
Court also adopted the liberal approach to the parol evidence
rule,63 though not in as explicit a fashion as did California. In
Smith v. Melson, Inc.,' the court held that a contract should be
interpreted with regard to the surrounding circumstances so as to
determine the parties' intentions and that such circumstances may
always be considered by the court.6' The court further held that
the contract at issue was unambiguous, granting the appellant's
request for specific performance based upon the plain meaning of
the contract language.66
Although this holding seems consistent with the traditional
approach to the parol evidence rule,67 the court would hold one
year later, in Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters
Insurance Co.,' that the Smith decision signified the adoption of
the Corbin view in Arizona.69 In Darner, the court cited Smith for
the proposition that because interpretation of an agreement is not
limited to the words of the document alone, evidence of all
surrounding circumstances, including prior negotiations, should be
admitted.7 Thus, Arizona switched to the liberal version of the
parol evidence rule without having ever previously held that a
change had taken place.7'
63. See Robert L. Gottsfield, Darner Motor Sales v. Universal Underwriters:
Corbin, Williston and the Continued Viability of the Parol Evidence Rule in
Arizona, 25 ARIz. ST. LJ. 377 (1993) (stating that Arizona had adopted Corbin's
liberal approach, requiring that the court "stand in the shoes of the contracting
parties").
64. 659 P.2d 1264 (Ariz. 1983).
65. Id. at 1266-67 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 212
(1981) and JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CoNTRACrs § 108 (1974)).
66. Id.
67. The holding is most notably consistent with the explicit finding that the
contract was unambiguous.
68. 682 P.2d 388 (Ariz. 1984).
69. Id. at 398.
70. Id.
71. The actual holding of the Darner court was that the liberal approach, which
it claimed to have been established in Smith, would be extended to boilerplate
insurance contracts, because it would be "anomalous" to follow the liberal
approach for bargained for contracts but employ the traditional approach for
standardized form contracts. Id. Thus, the court simply seized an opportunity to
change the rule as soon as one arguably presented itself. Interestingly, in 1991, the
Alaska Supreme Court adopted the reasoning in Darner and applied it to standard
form contracts even outside the insurance context. See Lauvetz v. Alaska Sales &
[Vol. 11:2
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The Arizona Supreme Court recently clarified its position in
Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.7" with a
complete discussion of the state of Arizona's parol evidence rule.
The Arizona Court of Appeals in Taylor had applied the "four
corners" approach to the agreement, finding that it was not
ambiguous and that the trial judge had erred by admitting parol
evidence to vary its terms.73 Such confusion as to the state of the
law in Arizona forced the supreme court to discuss the parol
evidence rule at length. After briefly discussing the basics of both
the traditional and liberal approaches, the court held that, because
the main purpose of contract interpretation in Arizona is to
recognize the intentions of the parties, extrinsic evidence should be
admitted without any preliminary finding of ambiguity.74
Reaffirming the notion that Smith v. Melson, Inc., had adopted
the Corbin view, the court outlined the two steps to be followed in
contract interpretation under that approach. First, a court must
examine evidence that bears upon the extent of integration,
illuminates the meaning of the contract language or demonstrates
the intent of the parties.' If evidence offered contradicts or
varies the language of the document, rather than aiding in its
interpretation, the court may disallow its admission.76 The court
then "finalizes" its understanding of the document, and it is at this
point that the parol evidence rule applies to exclude extrinsic
evidence that would contradict or vary the meaning of the written
words as determined by the court.7 7
In carrying out the first step described above, Arizona courts
are to apply the "reasonably susceptible" test as developed in
California's Pacific Gas decision.' Although acknowledging
criticism of Pacific Gas,79 the court held that the rule established
Serv., 828 P.2d 162, 165 (Alaska 1991).
72. 854 P.2d 1134 (Ariz. 1993).
73. Id. at 1137.
74. Id. at 1138.
75. Id. at 1139.
76. Id. For admission to be barred, however, the offered interpretation should
be "so unreasonable or extraordinary that it is improbable." I.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1140.
79. Id. at 1140 n.2. The court especially addressed the concerns of Judge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, who vocally opposes the liberal
approach. See Wilson Arlington Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 912 F.2d 366,
370 (9th Cir. 1990) ("If parties to an agreement could not rely on written words
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there correctly stated the Corbin view that parol evidence should
be excluded only if it contradicts or varies the written agree-
ment. o To determine whether exclusion is proper, a court must
first decide what the agreement means and if it could reasonably be
interpreted in different ways given the surrounding circumstances
at the time of contract formation."' The more improbable the
interpretation offered, the more convincing the evidence must be
before the contract can be adjudged "reasonably susceptible" to
that meaning.' Such an adjudication is a question of law for the
court.83
C. Alaska's Switch to the Liberal Approach
Alaska's eventual movement to the liberal approach was a
furtive effort, similar to that made by the Arizona court in that no
case ever explicitly stated that a theoretical adjustment in the
application of the parol evidence rule was being made. In 1977, a
minority of the Alaska Supreme Court supported such a move to
the Corbin approach, and, as the composition of the court changed
over the next few years, the position of Chief Justice Boochever
and Justice Rabinowitz gained majority approval.'m Unfortunately,
the court has never issued an opinion overruling the traditional
approach, as the California court did in Pacific Gas,' nor has it
ever remedied this omission as the Arizona court did in Taylor.86
The first sign that a majority in Alaska had adopted the liberal
approach came in Wright v. Vickaryous."' In a footnote to the
Wright opinion, the court proclaimed that Alaska had "moved away
from the cumbersome two-step process"' that had required a
to express their consent to the express terms of that agreement, those words would
become little more than sideshows in a circus of self-serving declarations as to
what the parties to the agreement really had in mind."); Trident Ctr. v. Connecti-
cut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) ("While [the liberal view
of the rule] creates much business for lawyers and an occasional windfall to some
clients, it leads only to frustration and delay for most litigants and clogs already
overburdened courts.").
80. Taylor, 854 P.2d at 1140 n.2.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1141.
83. Id. at 1144-45.
84. See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
85. 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968); see supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
86. 854 P.2d 1134 (Ariz. 1993); see supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
87. 598 P.2d 490 (Alaska 1979).
88. Id. at 497 n.22.
[Vol. 11:2
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
preliminary finding of ambiguity before extrinsic evidence would be
admitted. In support of this proposition, the court cited Chief
Justice Boochever's concurrence in Tsakres and the court's opinion
in Stordahl v. Government Employees Insurance Co.89
Neither of these cases, however, lend much support to the
contention that Alaska had previously abandoned the traditional
approach. In Tsakres, the court's opinion actually employed the
two-step analysis dismissed by the Wright court, holding that a
finding of ambiguity is necessary for extrinsic evidence to be
admissible in contract interpretation under Alaska law.9" Though
Chief Justice Boochever's concurrence in Tsakres discussed his and
Justice Rabinowitz's support for the liberal approach, it provides
little authority for the proposition that Alaska had adopted the
liberal position. That such an opinion was expressed separately
from the majority decision indicates precisely the opposite, that the
court had not previously accepted the liberal view.
The Stordahl decision, which followed Tsakres, was also
misinterpreted by the court in Wright. Rather than acknowledging
that Alaska had "moved away from the two-step process," Stordahl
confirmed the continuing viability of the traditional approach by
creating an explicit exception to the two-tiered test in the insurance
context. The court found that due to the inequality of bargaining
power in the case of insurance contracts, their interpretation must
be controlled by "somewhat different standards" than those applied
to other contracts.9" Thus, where the court is dealing with an
insurance contract, ambiguity need not be found for the court to
admit extrinsic evidence bearing upon the reasonable expectations
of the parties.9' The court, "[k]eeping in mind the special consid-
erations applicable to insurance contracts," then employed the
method set out in the Wessells footnote and the Tsakres concur-
rence.
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Upon examination of their holdings, neither the Tsakres nor
the Stordahl opinion lends support to the assertion by the Wright
court that Alaska had previously abandoned the two-step rule
requiring an initial finding of ambiguity. The court, nevertheless,
elevated the Wright footnote to accepted status with its decision in
89. 564 P.2d 63 (Alaska 1977).
90. See Tsakres v. Owens, 561 P.2d 1218, 1221-22 (Alaska 1977).
91. Stordahl, 564 P.2d at 65.




Peterson v. Wirum,94 citing the footnote for the proposition that
extrinsic evidence as to the intent of the parties is admissible
without any prerequisite finding of ambiguity.95 The court stated
that the object of contract interpretation was "to give effect to the
reasonable expectations of the parties., 96  To ascertain these
expectations, courts must look to relevant extrinsic evidence as well
as to the contract language."
The reasons for these unsupported assertions in Wright and
Peterson are unclear, just as the state of the law regarding applica-
tion of the parol evidence rule must have been at the time. Had
the court simply issued an opinion explaining that the traditional
approach was being overruled and the liberal rule adopted,
confusion could have been avoided in ensuing years. By not doing
so, however, the parol evidence rule remained in a state of flux,
with no clear rule of law explicitly laid down to which either the
lower courts or Alaska practitioners could refer.
Upon reflection today, it is clear that by the time of the
Peterson decision, the Alaska Supreme Court had implicitly
overruled National Bank of Alaska, which had established the two-
step test. In fact, judging by the court's application of the parol
evidence rule, the liberal approach was in place with the Wright
decision, but the court did not hold that such a change had
occurred until its decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
O'Kelley.98 In O'Kelley, the court stated, again in a footnote to
the opinion, that the two-tiered test had been "criticized" and held
that extrinsic evidence may be consulted without any requirement
of an initial finding of ambiguity.99 Thus, the liberal approach to
the parol evidence rule was officially in place in Alaska.
94. 625 P.2d 866 (Alaska 1981).
95. Id. at 871-72 n.9 (citing Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490, 497 n.22
(Alaska 1979)). The court in Peterson also addressed the "clearly erroneous"
standard, see supra note 44, holding that where extrinsic evidence is not in dispute,
the court is not limited by that standard in its review of lower court decisions. In
these cases, contract interpretation is treated as a matter of law. Peterson, 625
P.2d at 871-72.
96. Id. at 872 n.10.
97. Id. Although the court cited Wright for this proposition, this concept was
originally enunciated by the court in Stordahl, which dealt exclusively with the
interpretation of insurance contracts. See Stordahl, 564 P.2d at 66.
98. 645 P.2d 767 (Alaska 1982).
99. Id. at 771 n.1.
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V. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
A. Alaska Northern: The Alaska Supreme Court Cedes Reviewing
Authority
In 1983, the Alaska Supreme Court finally made an effort to
provide a detailed explanation of the state of the parol evidence
rule. In Alaska Northern Development, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co.,,' the court reviewed the superior court's application
of the parol evidence rule to bar introduction of extrinsic evidence
that would have limited the scope of the Alyeska management
committee's power to approve a sale of surplus parts. For the
lower court to bar evidence regarding the existence of additional
terms not explicitly found in the contract, the court held that a two-
step determination must be made.'0 '
The first step asks whether the document represents an
integrated agreement. A finding of integration depends upon
whether the parties intended the writing to be a final expression of
one or more terms of the agreement.'O° Such a finding was to be
made by the court as a question of fact, taking into consideration
all relevant evidence, including that of surrounding circumstanc-
es.' ° The parol evidence rule applies only to integrated portions
of the agreement.
Second, the court determines whether the proffered evidence
of "a prior or contemporaneous agreement contradicts or is
inconsistent with the integrated portions [of the contract]."'" For
this purpose, inconsistency is defined as "the absence of reasonable
harmony in terms of the language and respective obligations of the
parties."'0" If contradiction or inconsistency exists, the parol
100. 666 P.2d 33 (Alaska 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
101. Id. at 37.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTs § 209 cmt. c (1979)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 40 (quoting Snyder v. Herbert Greenbaum & Assoc., Inc., 380 A.2d
618, 623 (Md. 1977)). In adopting this definition of inconsistency, the court
rejected a definition, proposed by Alaska Development, that would have been
more lenient in the admission of extrinsic evidence. Alaska Development
proposed that the court adopt New York's definition that "the term must
contradict or negate a term of the writing. A term or condition which has a lesser
effect is provable." Id. (quoting Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 270
N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966)).
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evidence rule bars admission of such extrinsic evidence. According
to the court, this determination often cannot be made from the face
of the writing. Where reasonable people could differ as to the
interpretation of the disputed terms, the choice between reasonable
inferences should be treated as a question of fact, but where the
proposed meaning is not one to which the language is "reasonably
susceptible," the meaning is established by the court as a matter of
law.1" The court also held that even if the evidence is consistent
with the writing, it could still be barred if the court finds that the
writing would have included the term if it was intended to be part
of the agreement."°
Thus, Alaska Northern finally provided an explicit definition
of the parol evidence rule in Alaska, at least for those cases where
a party wished to offer evidence of additional terms. The rule
established by the court is consistent with the approach champi-
oned by Corbin in the Second Restatement of Contracts and
adopted by California and Arizona, as well as several other
states."0 8 Nevertheless, Alaska Northern did not alleviate the
difficulty that the parol evidence rule had created in Alaska; it
merely diverted the confusion in another direction.
B. Problems with the New Rule
The decision in Alaska Northern proclaimed that both the
initial finding of integration and the decision regarding which
"reasonable" interpretation would be employed were questions for
the finder of fact, not questions of law. Thus, the only aspect of
parol evidence decisions that would not be subject to the "clearly
erroneous" standard'09 upon appellate review was whether the
106. Id. at 39 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 215 cmt. b
(1979)).
107. Id. at 37.
108. See, e.g., Admiral Builders Say. & Loan Ass'n v. South River Landing, Inc.,
502 A.2d 1096, 1098-1100 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Bryan v. Vaughn, 579 S.W.2d
177, 181-82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
109. It is a general principle of legal procedure that trial court factual findings
will only be overturned if the reviewing court determines them to be clearly
erroneous. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.") Such deference is given to
findings of fact because the trial court is in the best position to view the disputed
evidence. Associated Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc. v. H. & W. Constr. Co., 438 P.2d
224 (Alaska 1968) (holding that judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing
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language was "reasonably susceptible" to more than one interpreta-
tion. By framing the issues so narrowly, the Alaska Supreme Court
limited its authority in parol evidence cases, deferring the decision
regarding the admission of extrinsic evidence to the trial court.
The difficulty inherent in such an approach was borne out in
cases following Alaska Northern. In Kennedy Associates v.
Fischer,"' for example, the Alaska Supreme Court held that
although the court will exercise its independent judgment where the
interpretation of a contract is based solely upon documentary
evidence, the "clearly erroneous" standard must be applied where
extrinsic evidence has been admitted and relied upon by the trial
court.' Although Kennedy Associates did not involve an inte-
grated contract and, thus, was not a parol evidence rule case, the
same philosophy was employed in parol evidence cases. In Norton
v. Herron," for example, the court held that the "clearly errone-
ous" standard is to be applied whenever extrinsic evidence
admitted by the trial court is in dispute."' When such evidence
is not in dispute, however, the interpretation question becomes one
of law."4  Thus, the availability of appellate review turns on
whether admitted extrinsic evidence is disputed at trial. This
distinction was affirmed in Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Tundra
Tours,"5 where the court held that "[b]ecause extrinsic evidence
was presented at trial regarding interpretation of the parties'
agreement, we are confined to determining whether the facts
support the trial court's interpretation. We will not reverse the
trial court's factual findings . . .unless they are clearly errone-
ous."
116
By admitting extrinsic evidence where a contract term is
merely "reasonably susceptible" to a proposed interpretation, the
trial court exposed itself to a litany of factual disputes. Because the
findings of fact that emerge from these disputes can be overturned
only where "clearly erroneous," the Alaska Supreme Court left the
application of the parol evidence rule in the hands of the trial
conflicting evidence is a function of the trial court).
110. 667 P.2d 174 (Alaska 1983).
111. Id. at 179.
112. 677 P.2d 877 (Alaska 1984).
113. Id. at 880.
114. Id.
115. 719 P.2d 1020 (Alaska 1986).
116. Id. at 1025 (citations omitted).
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courts. Far from simplifying the process, this approach promoted
inconsistency among courts in their application of the rule." 7
This established confusion among practitioners, as parol evidence
determinations could vary depending on the trial judge before
whom they appeared."'
Under the previously employed two-tiered test described in
National Bank of Alaska,"9 such difficulties were much less likely
to occur because the finding of ambiguity as a matter of law was
more stringent than the "reasonably susceptible" approach. Thus,
the supreme court would be able to justify a reversal of an
incorrect factual finding regarding the meaning of a term by
overturning the trial court's decision as to ambiguity. A "reason-
ably susceptible" finding by the trial court erects a more formidable
barrier to intervention by a reviewing court. Indeed, the utter lack
of any cases in which the Alaska Supreme Court reversed a
"reasonably susceptible" finding substantiates the claim that the
power in these cases rested in the hands of the trial court.
C. Lower Kuskokwim II: The Alaska Supreme Court Moves
Toward Regaining Control
In light of the cases following Alaska Northern, where virtually
all extrinsic evidence was admissible under the "reasonably
susceptible" standard and the Alaska Supreme Court was virtually
powerless to review the lower court's decisions allowing such
evidence, it is no wonder that it was argued before the Alaska
Supreme Court that the parol evidence rule was a "dead letter" in
Alaska Diversified Contractors, Inc. v. Lower Kuskokwim School
117. Because the findings of trial courts are largely unreviewable, the Alaska
Supreme Court is unable to reconcile inconsistent holdings to create a coherent
body of parol evidence case law.
118. This is not to suggest that the jury should have no place in disputes
involving the parol evidence rule, but rather that the threshold legal determination
of whether a question of fact exists regarding the meaning of a term should be a
more formidable one than existed in Alaska under Alaska Northern. The
uniformity called for here is uniformity in the application of the parol evidence
rule in general, not in the ultimate decision of a particular case. It is desirable that
the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence be the same throughout the
jurisdiction. Admissibility of parol evidence, therefore, should be evaluated as a
question of law, subject to appellate review, regardless of the theoretical position
of the court.
119. 546 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1976).
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District.20 The rule made a practical comeback in this case,
which had found its way back to the supreme court after remand
from Lower Kuskokwim School District v. Alaska Diversified
Contractors, Inc.121  The contract at issue there called for a
construction project to be completed by a specific date." Alaska
Diversified, however, presented evidence that in prior negotiations
the parties had agreed to allow completion up to eleven months
later and that this was the reason for only nominal liquidated
damages being provided for under the contract during this
period.' 2
In Lower Kuskokwim 1, the supreme court regained some of
the power it had relinquished to the lower courts. First, the court
held that even though the trial court made no ruling on integration,
it could find the document to be completely integrated because the
question of integration is a question of law for the court to
decide.124 This position, however, conflicted with the one taken
in Alaska Northern, which the Lower Kuskokwim I court cited,'
25
where the court had held that "[w]hether a writing is integrated is
a question of fact to be determined by the court in accordance with
all relevant evidence."'" Thus, the court misapplied Alaska
Northern and, in so doing, created a reviewable question of law on
the integration issue.
Later in the Lower Kuskokwim I opinion, the court further
contradicted its precedents. Without invoking either the "reason-
ably susceptible" standard or the "clearly erroneous" standard, the
court held that the evidence offered by Alaska Diversified
contradicted the writing and was, therefore, barred by the parol
evidence rule. 27 In Alaska Northern, however, the court had
held that in determining whether an offered interpretation
contradicted the writing, the question was one of fact if the
evidence conflicted as to meaning.' 2 The meaning could only be
120. 778 P.2d 581, 583 (Alaska 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990)
[hereinafter Lower Kuskokwim 11].
121. 734 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1987) [hereinafter Lower Kuskokwim 1].




126. Alaska N. Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33,37 (Alaska
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
127. Lower Kuskokwim I, 734 P.2d at 64.
128. Alaska Northern, 666 P.2d at 39.
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determined as a matter of law if "'the asserted meaning [is not] one
to which the language of the writing, read in context, is reasonably
susceptible.""' 29 The trial court in Lower Kuskokwim I had
apparently found the contract language to be "reasonably suscepti-
ble" to the meaning asserted by Alaska Diversified, or it could not
have admitted extrinsic evidence as to the issue. The court, by also
not employing the "clearly erroneous" standard in overruling the
trial court's findings, treated the determination of whether an
asserted meaning is contradictory as a question of law.
In Lower Kuskokwim II, the court disniissed the claim that the
Alaska parol evidence rule was dead.30 In so doing, the court
quoted extensively from the holding in Alaska Northern, but in its
presentation of the Alaska Northern standards, the court portrayed
the application of the parol evidence rule in Alaska in a more
restrictive light. The court held that, according to Alaska Northern,
three determinations must be made before the parol evidence rule
can be applied: "(1) whether the contract is integrated, (2) what the
contract means, and (3) whether the prior agreement conflicts with
the integrated agreement." '' The parol evidence rule is not
applicable until the second step has been completed. When the
court considers the question of meaning, extrinsic evidence may
always be consulted. 33
The court further suggested that Alaska Diversified's confusion
regarding the rule stemmed from the distinction between using
extrinsic evidence to determine meaning and barring its use to
change that meaning once it has been determined."3 The ques-
tion of meaning, including a review of extrinsic evidence to
determine if there are conflicting assertions, is one of law to be
determined by the court.135 Where the court finds the evidence
to conflict, the court must still decide the question of meaning
unless the written language is reasonably susceptible to both
meanings, in which case it becomes a question for the jury.131
129. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 215 cmt. b
(1979)).
130. Lower Kuskokwim II, 778 P.2d at 583.
131. Id.







Although the court used virtually the same language in Lower
Kuskokwim II as it had in Alaska Northern, the role of the court
is far more prominent in the former's application of the parol
evidence rule. This critical distinction goes well beyond a mere
question of semantics. In Alaska Northern, the court held that
meaning is a question of fact unless "'no other meaning is reason-
able.""'37 This implies that questions of meaning are presumed
to be questions of fact unless it is exceedingly clear that only one
meaning could ever be given to the contract terms under the
circumstances. Lower Kuskokwim II, however, holds that "the
court.., must nonetheless decide the question of meaning except
where the written language, read in context, is reasonably suscepti-
ble to both asserted meanings."'3 Contrary to Alaska Northern,
this construction implies a presumption that the question is one of
law unless it is shown that both asserted meanings are "reason-
able."
In other words, under Alaska Northern, meaning is a question
of fact unless an asserted meaning is shown to be unreasonable,
whereas under Lower Kuskokwim II, meaning is a question of law
unless two asserted meanings are shown to be reasonable. Such a
shift casts the parol evidence rule in a more restrictive light. Under
Alaska Northern, the question of meaning is more likely to be
treated as a question of fact, and, consequently, the "clearly
erroneous" standard is more likely to impede review of trial court
decisions. By changing this standard, again without explicitly
overruling prior decisions, and, indeed, by relying on the contrary
holding in Alaska Northern, the court procured more power for
itself in parol evidence cases and avoided the drawbacks of
excessive applicability of the "clearly erroneous" standard.'
D. The Current Status of the Parol Evidence Rule in Alaska
The Alaska Supreme Court again grappled with the parol
evidence rule in Western Pioneer, Inc. v. Harbor Enterprises,
137. Alaska N. Dev., Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 666 P.2d 33,39 (Alaska
1983) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 215 cmt. b (1979)),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1041 (1984).
138. Lower Kuskokwim II, 778 P.2d at 584.
139. It is important to reiterate, however, that whether or not meaning is
considered a question of law, extrinsic evidence is always admissible on questions
of meaning. Id. Thus, this is still a liberal application of the parol evidence rule.
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Inc.,40 which chronicles the current status of the rule."' Ac-
cording to Vestern Pioneer, the parol evidence rule in Alaska is
applicable when one party seeks to admit evidence which varies or
contradicts an integrated contract. 42 When this occurs the three
step test articulated in Lower Kuskokwim 11 is employed.143
Whether the evidence is conflicting is a question for the court, as
is the meaning of the contract.'44 If the relevant language is
reasonably susceptible to two asserted meanings, however, the
question becomes one of fact.45 Extrinsic evidence is always
admissible to determine integration and meaning, the first two steps
in the Lower Kuskokwim 11 test.146 Whether there is conflicting
extrinsic evidence depends upon whether the asserted prior
agreement is inconsistent with the written document, and inconsis-
tency is determined according to the definition adopted in Alaska
Northern.47 Where the extrinsic evidence is found to be conflict-
ing, the parol evidence rule bars its admission.
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULE'S CURRENT STATE
A. Practical Consequences
Over the past decade, the Alaska Supreme Court has greatly
improved its treatment of the parol evidence rule by maintaining
a higher level of consistency among its holdings and by explicitly
stating the methodology by which it will evaluate cases involving
the rule. Currently, the status of the rule is more clearly defined
than at any other juncture in Alaska history. Some improvements,
140. 818 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1991).
141. Id. at 657 n.4. Prior to Western Pioneer, the court had reiterated its powers
of de novo review of lower court decisions in cases of contract interpretation. In
Zuelsdorf v. University of Alaska, 794 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1990), the court, though
not addressing the parol evidence rule, held that the interpretation of contracts
presents a question of law for the court to decide, subject to de novo review by the
Alaska Supreme Court. Id. at 933; see also Cox v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co.,
869 P.2d 467, 468 n.1 (Alaska 1994); Johnson v. Schaub, 867 P.2d 812, 818 n.12
(Alaska 1994). "[R]esolution of disputes regarding surrounding circumstances is
for the trier of fact." Zuelsdorf, 794 P.2d at 933.





147. Id.; see supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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however, could be made that would further clarify the rule for
practitioners and lower courts.
To develop a more consistent body of case law, the court
should either follow its precedent strictly or explicitly alter or
overrule that precedent when it wishes to change the state of the
law. As evidenced by its furtive move to the Corbin approach, and
again by its Lower Kuskokwim H1 opinion, the Alaska Supreme
Court has preferred to "bend" its prior decisions, recharacterizing
those holdings as supporting the court's current position, rather
than expressly overruling prior holdings. Although bending
precedent to support a current decision makes the court appear to
be more consistent, this approach undermines the importance of
precedent in parol evidence jurisprudence and engenders confusion,
leaving practitioners and the lower courts unclear as to which cases
they can or should rely upon.
Although the Alaska Supreme Court was free to overrule
earlier precedent and thereby adjust the state of the law to conform
with current theory,"4 its parol evidence decisions created confu-
sion by failing to inform the legal community that such a change
was being made and by not articulating the reasons behind the
change. The resulting inconsistency is especially problematic in a
jurisdiction such as Alaska where years may elapse between
reported parol evidence cases, creating few opportunities for the
court to clarify its position. To avoid such difficulty, it is of
paramount importance that the court be clear and concise when it
makes theoretical changes, particularly where the parol evidence
rule is at issue. Although an attorney can never be certain whether
a particular piece of extrinsic evidence will be held to be admissible
at trial, it is essential that practitioners know whether the court will
be restrictive or liberal in its enforcement of the rule. Familiarity
with the theory employed by the court will enable practitioners to
148. See Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173,1176 (Alaska
1993) ("[W]e will overrule a prior decision only when 'clearly convinced that the
rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions,
and that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent'.
.. " (quoting State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 610 (Alaska 1986) (quoting State v.
Souter, 606 P.2d 399, 400 (Alaska 1980)))); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487
(1935) ("The common law is not immutable, but flexible, and upon its own




more accurately predict which evidence is likely to be admitted at
trial, aiding them in devising effective trial strategies.
B. Theoretical Consequences
Several of the difficulties that arose after the Alaska Northern
opinion could have been avoided had the court never abandoned
the traditional approach. The more restrictive, traditional approach
offers two advantages over its liberal counterpart. First, where
courts are willing to allow virtually any extrinsic evidence to be
admitted at trial, as under the liberal approach, the courts expose
themselves to potential fraud, as the parties can attempt to attach
any "reasonable" meaning to the contract at trial. Under the
traditional approach, however, the parties are more likely to be
bound by the specific terms of the contract, thus limiting the
opportunity for parties to re-evaluate their intentions in light of
changed circumstances after a contract has been formed. The more
restrictive approach encourages parties to write "better" contracts,
as they will likely be bound by those terms.149  Secondly, the
traditional approach promotes judicial economy.15 The more
extrinsic evidence that is admitted at trial, the more time the court
will spend sifting through such evidence to determine the meaning
of the contract terms. Where the restrictive approach is employed,
terms are more likely to be found to have definite meaning, and
such time-consuming arguments are avoided.
In the Alaska context, the problems that evolved from the
expanded application of the "clearly erroneous" standard would not
149. Proponents of the liberal approach, on the other hand, argue that the
traditional approach is more conducive to fraud because it fails to admit evidence
of surrounding circumstances that would more accurately depict the intent of the
parties. Thus, the parties may be bound by an agreement neither intended. See,
e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule,
50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 173 (1965). This concern is partially obviated by the fact
that, under the traditional approach, such surrounding circumstances are taken into
consideration when the trial judge initially considers whether ambiguity exists.
Such concerns can further be alleviated by better drafting of the written contract
which makes the parties' intentions clear. The possibilities of fraud invited by the
liberal approach cannot be so easily eliminated. Where parties are allowed to
offer virtually any evidence regarding a "reasonable" meaning, an attempted fraud
can be avoided only where the fact finder can correctly determine which party is
misrepresenting the facts.
150. See Wilson Arlington Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 912 F.2d 366, 370




have occurred under the two-tiered approach adopted in National
Bank. 5' Under that approach, before extrinsic evidence could be
admitted to determine meaning, the court was required to find the
language of the contract to be ambiguous in light of the surround-
ing circumstances. Under this approach, interpretation is only a
non-reviewable question of fact when the reviewing court agrees
that ambiguity exists, not simply when conflicting evidence has
been admitted at trial. Thus, the higher courts retain tighter
control of the status of the rule and are able to ensure its consistent
application.
VII. CONCLUSION
Without regard to whether the current Alaska Supreme Court
prefers the traditional or liberal approach, it should, at the next
opportunity, issue an exhaustive opinion on the state of the parol
evidence rule in Alaska similar in form to that of Arizona's Taylor
decision.' The opinion should begin with a theoretical discus-
sion outlining why the court prefers one approach over another.
The Alaska Supreme Court has never before discussed its theoreti-
cal position or its reasons for a particular preference. The opinion
should also detail exactly how the rule is to be applied in Alaska.
At this point, the court should cite relevant precedent and
disapprove of those cases which have been found to be in conflict
with the current state of the rule, rather than attempting to
manipulate them to fit the current position. Such a discussion
would be immensely useful to practitioners who wish to prepare
effective parol evidence arguments before the Alaska courts. Once
such an opinion has been issued, its theoretical underpinnings
should not be strayed from in subsequent cases. Only by such a
straightforward approach can the confusion surrounding the parol
evidence rule in Alaska, fostered by decades of inconsistent
opinions and furtive changes in the law, finally be put to rest.
Leonard Marinaccio, III
151. 546 P.2d 579 (Alaska 1976).
152. Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134 (Ariz. 1993); see
supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text.
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